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ABSTRACT
Since the 1990s, climate change impact discourse has highlighted potential for large
scale violent conﬂicts. However, the role of climate stresses on local conﬂicts over
natural resources, the role of policies and adaptation in these conﬂicts, and
opportunities to enhance cooperation have been neglected. These gaps are
addressed in this paper using evidence from participatory action research on 79
cases of local collective action over natural resources that experience conﬂicts in
Bangladesh and Nepal. Climate trends and stresses contributed to just under half of
these conﬂict cases. Nine factors that enable greater cooperation and
transformation of conﬂict are identiﬁed. Participatory dialogue and negotiation
processes, while not suﬃcient, changed understanding, attitudes and positions of
actors. Many of the communities innovated physical measures to overcome natural
resource constraints, underlying conﬂict, and/or institutional reforms. These
changes were informed by improving understanding of resource limitations and
indigenous knowledge. Learning networks among community organizations
encouraged collective action by sharing successes and creating peer pressure.
Incentives for cooperation were important. For example, when community
organizations formally permitted excluded traditional resource users to access
resources, those actors complied with rules and paid towards management costs.
However, elites were able to use policy gaps to capture resources with changed
characteristics due to climate change. In most of the cases where conﬂict persisted,
power, policy and institutional barriers prevented community-based organizations
from taking up potential adaptations and innovations. Policy frameworks
recognizing collective action and supporting ﬂexible innovation in governance and
adaptation would enable wider transformation of natural resource conﬂicts into
cooperation.
Key policy insights
. Climate stresses, policy gaps and interventions can all worsen local natural resource
conﬂicts.
. Sectoral knowledge and technical approaches to adaptation are open to elite
capture and can foster conﬂicts.
. Many local natural resource conﬂicts can be resolved but this requires an enabling
environment for participatory dialogue, external facilitation, ﬂexible responses to
context, and recognition of disadvantaged stakeholder interests.
. Transforming conﬂict to greater cooperation mostly involves social and
institutional changes, so adaptation policies should focus less on physical works
and more on enabling factors such as negotiation, local institutions, knowledge,
and incentives.
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Potential for violent conﬂicts and security concerns have been a focus of popular and scientiﬁc climate change
impact discourse since the 1990s. Recent literature, such as Gleditsch and Nordås (2014), has focused on violent
conﬂict and the complex potential links with climate change. However, any causal links are complex and sup-
porting evidence has often been revealed as ﬂimsy (Scheﬀran, Brzoska, Brauch, Link, & Schilling, 2012). For
example, large-scale migration has been both conceptualized and challenged as a mechanism that brings
those vulnerable to climate change into violent conﬂict with recipient societies (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016;
Burrows & Kinney, 2016). A common framework argues that climate change adversely aﬀects natural resource
productivity and livelihoods, leading to conﬂicts when people respond to these changes in the social-ecological
system, while state actors fund interventions to manage resources better (Barnett & Adger, 2007). However,
multi-scalar forces are at play which make local natural resource management complex and nested, and adap-
tation and mitigation initiatives themselves can add new sources of competition and potential conﬂict over
commons (Ojha et al., 2016a).
Research focusing on violent conﬂict and its links with climate change, such as Gleditsch and Nordås (2014),
has ﬁltered out wider interpretations of conﬂict. Multiple studies have also used a macro viewpoint of conﬂict
and climate change based on secondary data on violent conﬂict (Nordas & Gleditsch, 2007; Wischnath & Buhaug,
2014), possibly because data sets exist on such conﬂicts. This paper takes an alternative approach, in focusing on
widespread local competition and conﬂicts that have received limited attention in the literature linking conﬂict
and climate change. It aligns with the interpretation and institutional analysis framework of Ratner, Meinzen-
Dick, May, and Haglund (2013) and Ratner et al. (2017) and the challenge of transforming natural resource com-
petition to strengthen social-ecological resilience and mitigate conﬂict. Ratner et al. (2017) use diverse cases
from the literature to argue for strengthening collective action as a way of preventing conﬂict based on under-
standing stakeholder narratives, institutions that strengthen the rights of weaker actors, and dialogue. We inter-
pret conﬂict as local contestation and confrontation over natural resources. In many of the cases presented, this
is not violent and arises when actors perceive injustice, usually over access rights.
With the potential for climate change to tip the balance in natural resource management towards conﬂict,
climate change policies and their application, including adaptation, need to be conﬂict sensitive. The novel con-
tribution of this paper is evidence based on 79 cases of local collective action over natural resources in Bangladesh
and Nepal that have experienced conﬂicts, and analysing not only the role of climate related stresses, but also
those factors that have enabled a change to greater cooperation. Like Ratner et al. (2017) the roles of unsupportive
policies and interpretations of policies regarding community rights are revealed, but in some cases local conﬂict
played a positive role in transformation to more just natural resource access. Some cases show how community-
based adaptation and collective action can go hand-in-hand, but in other cases adaptation investments such as
infrastructure were found to have contributed to conﬂicts. These lessons are relevant to programme and policy
design and application at national and sub-national levels for governments and funding agencies.
2. Context
The Ganges-Brahmaputra basin hosts over 500 million people who are highly vulnerable to climatic changes. At
two extremes of this vulnerability are the inhabitants of ﬂoodplains in Bangladesh and hills in Nepal. Both
countries have high levels of poverty and high vulnerability to climate change impacts on livelihoods. With a
population density of over 1,000 persons per km2 in Bangladesh, there is intense pressure on common pool
resources notably wetlands. In Nepal, degradation of forests is a persistent problem with associated loss of eco-
system services. Human pressure on resources has been compounded by weak governance. With the aim of
improving governance, communitymanagement of commonpool natural resources has spread in both countries.
2.1. Climate change stresses and adaptation
Bangladesh and Nepal are both preparing National Adaptation Plans which are expected to mainstream adap-
tation into longer term national, sectoral and local plans. However, in the study period climate adaptation was
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guided by National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) which have not considered natural resource
conﬂict1.
The Bangladesh NAPA (Ministry of Environment and Forest, 2009) highlighted the problems of coastal inun-
dation, intrusion of saline surface water in the dry season, drought and more unreliable rains, river and ﬂash
ﬂoods, and intensiﬁed cyclonic storm surges. In a strongly centralized state, more funds have been allocated
towards short term adaptation including continued investment in large scale water infrastructure. In inter-
national forums, public and civil society actors portray the country as a climate change victim to attract adap-
tation funding.
The Nepal NAPA (Ministry of Environment, 2010) highlighted the problems of changing patterns of monsoon
rains, glacier melting, landslides, ﬂoods, decreased winter rain, drying up of water sources, and increased inci-
dences of pests and diseases. Negative impacts are most likely along the Himalayan foothills due to their sloping
and fragile topography. However, unlike most other countries, Nepal’s main implementation strategy has been
through decentralized Local Adaptation Plans of Action (LAPA) developed by communities under the lowest tier
of government (Ojha et al., 2016b). This has directed 80% of funds to local challenges but is in ﬂux, with a change
in 2017 to a federal system and larger but more autonomous local government units. Mitigation policies mainly
focus on forests, and the trend is to reverse decentralized community forestry with more centralized manage-
ment decisions and restrictions on forest use.
2.2. Community-based natural resource management and networking
In Bangladesh, community-based co-management started in ﬁsheries and local water management in the
mid-1990s, increasing to over 500 ﬂoodplain community-based organizations (CBOs) (Sultana & Thompson,
2010). CBOs of mainly poor natural resource users were formed to address weak natural resource governance.
User participation in decisions was expected to improve compliance with rules, improve resource pro-
ductivity, and provide more equitable access to those resources. These CBOs represent users from one to
several adjacent villages with responsibility for spatially deﬁned natural resources. Collective action among
ﬁshers oﬀers higher catches from restoring habitat and conserving ﬁsh, and local conﬂicts between elites
and ﬁshers over access are reduced where there are well established CBOs with deﬁned secure use rights
(Bennett et al., 2001). Policies since 2000 have also devolved responsibility for managing water control struc-
tures (sluices) for agriculture to CBOs, partly in response to past conﬂicts (Mandal, 1994). Since 2007, a
network of CBOs has developed for structured adaptive learning between CBOs, and CBOs have enhanced
resilience to climate stresses by focusing on community ecosystem beneﬁts (Sultana & Thompson, 2012).
Despite these initiatives to devolve natural resource management, in the water sector, investment is
mainly in embankments to encircle areas as ‘polders’, with little space for water user groups and associations
to act independently or inﬂuence planning. Moreover, government policies have not recognized long term
use rights for CBOs in wetlands, and multiple agencies impact on wetland landscapes with little coordination.
CBOs have tried to raise these issues, but the space for community engagement in policy dialogue is very
limited.
In Nepal, community-based natural resource management started in the early 1980s in response to environ-
mental degradation and increasing costs of top down natural resource protection (McDougall et al., 2008). This
expanded to over 18,000 community forestry user groups (CFUGs) across the country. Members of most CFUGs
come from several small settlements (hamlets) within one village. These grassroots institutions wanted to con-
solidate and articulate their interests in wider national policies. This led to CFUGs networking and the emer-
gence of the Federation of Community Forest Users Nepal (FECOFUN) a membership body of all CFUGs.
FECOFUN aims to amplify CFUG voices, ensure forest policy decisions do not compromise the interests of
forest dependent people, and mobilize citizens on environmental issues (Paudel, Monterroso, & Cronkleton,
2012). There have been frequent conﬂicts between FECOFUN and the government over forest governance,
resulting in impasse and consequent adverse impacts on forest conservation and the wellbeing of local com-
munities (Satyal, Corbera, Dawson, Dhungana, & Maskey, 2018).
In the context of similar extensive community-based natural resource management, but diﬀerences between
the two countries in adaptation and policy dialogue, this paper aims to improve understanding of how collective
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action can be enabled to reduce natural resource conﬂicts associated with climate change stresses and related
responses.
3. Study design and method
3.1. Site selection
Consultations with CBOs, government and NGOs in both countries identiﬁed, ﬁrstly, natural resource issues
where conﬂicts were considered to be important and, secondly, climate stressed environments. Three geo-
graphic-environment-climate stress regions intersecting with four main issues were identiﬁed in Bangladesh
(Table 1) and two main regions intersecting with four main issues were identiﬁed in Nepal (Table 2).
Members of the research team had worked collaboratively with many of the existing CBOs in the two countries
since the mid-1990s, and using this knowledge, purposively selected 45 sites in Bangladesh and 21 in Nepal to
represent these natural resource conﬂict issues and environments. Three sites/CBOs were typically selected to
represent each environment-issue combination.
In Bangladesh, most of the conﬂicts studied are over access to, or allocation of, water or other aspects of
water security. There is a contrast between local collective action in sharing water or growing crops with
lower water demands, and public infrastructure including sluices and silted waterways that often do not
meet local needs and instead make seasonal ﬂooding and drainage worse for some communities. The other
main source of conﬂicts is inequitable rights to public lands and waters, including elite capture and encroach-
ment of ﬂoodplains to the exclusion of poor women and men who depend on wild aquatic resources for their
livelihoods.
In Nepal, most of the conﬂicts studied centre on access disputes over community forest resources between
designated user communities and other traditional users, or lack of access to scarce water for poor women and
men. This reﬂects hilly terrain, decentralized governance, and local adaptation plans and projects supporting
small scale actions.
3.2. Action research and adaptive learning
Participatory research can be deﬁned as ‘systematic inquiry, with the collaboration of those aﬀected by the
issue being studied, for purposes of education and taking action or eﬀecting change’ (Green et al., 2003, p.
419). This study took the view that participatory action research is embedded in a process expected to
empower the disadvantaged and to facilitate change, by documenting the local socio-ecological system
and how it has changed, understanding these processes and the role (if any) of climate factors and policies,
identifying options and opportunities, and facilitating the testing of new arrangements, whether institutional
or technical.
Table 1. Breakdown of study sites selected in Bangladesh.
Conﬂict issue Coastal (southwest) N = 21
Drought and erosion prone
(northwest) N = 18
Deeply ﬂooded (haor)
(northeast) N = 6
Agriculture and water management
N = 9 + 6
3 Non-saline 3 Sluice/ embanked areas (covered in other cases)
3 Saline (includes planned
embankment breaches)
Enclosure of ﬂoodplain commons/
land use change N = 15
3 Shrimp farming (expansion or
reduction)
3 Floodplain aquaculture 3 Aquaculture (enclosing
fallow land)
3 Prawn/ﬁsh; agriculture and
aquaculture
3 New land in main rivers - chars (new
crops, loss of commons)
Community managed ﬁsheries N =
15
3 Coastal/ estuarine 3 Closed wetlands 3 Waterbodies
3 Floodplain 3 Open wetlands
Other issues N = 6 3 Sundarbans forest resources
(access policies)
3 Water pollution
N = Number of sites selected purposively for action research, 9 + 6 indicates 9 sites primarily chosen and 6 chosen for other issues.
Conﬂict issues are the natural resource issues expected to arise in the sites.
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In each site, over about three years (2014–16), a common set of steps was followed. The research team
proﬁled the natural resource base, actors, access, institutions, CBOs and governance arrangements. Separate
sessions with each category of actor were used to understand their interests and interactions, past conﬂict trig-
gers, underlying factors and outcomes. The research team continued to facilitate a ﬂexible participatory action
research process with the CBO and other relevant actors with the aim of encouraging natural resource manage-
ment that would be considered more just by disadvantaged actors, and understanding how this did or did not
develop. A key element of the approach was adaptive learning - a structured process of ‘learning by doing’. This
concept was extended from a more technical focus on adaptive management of natural resources and adaptive
co-management involving a hierarchy of institutions and learning among stakeholders (Armitage, Marschke, &
Plummer, 2008).
Action research with individual CBOs incorporated an adaptive learning cycle where the CBO reviewed
how its actions aﬀected access to natural resources and beneﬁt distribution, and then adjusted its
actions. However, the scope for adaptive learning for a CBO is limited to its own experience. Adaptive learn-
ing networks have been tested between villages but focused on technical aspects of resource management
(Arthur & Garaway, 2005). The concept was extended in this study to learning between CBOs regarding
conﬂicts, adaptation and climate change. This involved the existing CBO networks noted in Section 2.2.
The process involved regular workshops between CBOs active within a region or district (see Figure 1).
Here, the leaders of each CBO shared experiences, and identiﬁed constraints, gaps, challenges and
conﬂicts faced. They coordinated the testing of new actions or changing practices to address resource man-
agement issues, and agreed how they would monitor and assess actions, which were reported back in the
next workshop.
4. Results
Summary ﬁndings on causes of conﬂict and how greater cooperation was enabled are drawn from all 79 cases,
making comparisons between countries, and complemented by examples.
4.1. Natural resource conﬂicts and their basis
In total, 79 cases of natural resource conﬂict in 72 sites were investigated, and through participatory action
research, attempts to reduce or transform them all were made by the CBOs with facilitation from the research
team. Several of the cases revealed more than one natural resource related conﬂict. In Bangladesh, communities
using four ﬂoodplain waterbodies faced conﬂicts over access rights and pollution from external sources, which
has been made worse by declining dry season water ﬂows possibly associated with climate trends. These
conﬂicts were also aﬀected by weak enforcement of water quality standards and environmental impact assess-
ment policies.
The case studies revealed that the type of natural resource issue expected in the initial selection of the cases
was not the actual main conﬂict issue in several cases. Cases identiﬁed originally as forest or water related were
Table 2. Breakdown of study sites selected in Nepal.
Conﬂict issue Hills and mountain N = 9 Lowland (Terai) N = 12
Community Forestry (CF) N = 12 3 Landscape: CF vs. pastoralists conﬂicts in
high mountain regions
3 Landscape: CF vs. distant users
3 Local: Elite capture 3 Local: CF vs. landless
Local Adaptation Plan of Action
(LAPA) N = 6
3 LAPA-NR issue 3 LAPA-NR issue
Water and multiple use water
systems N = 0 + 6
Water sharing (covered in LAPA cases) Water sharing (covered in LAPA cases)
Protected areas /buﬀer zones N
= 3
3 Park-people (wildlife depredation, denial of traditional uses,
distributional justice of park revenue)
N = Number of sites selected purposively for action research, 9 + 6 indicates 9 sites primarily chosen and 6 chosen for other issues.
Conﬂict issues are the natural resource issues expected to arise in the sites.
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generally found to have conﬂicts focused on these resources. However, in Bangladesh, 16 sites originally charac-
terized as aquaculture expansion or ﬁshery management conﬂicts were found to have wider conﬂicts over water
management. In Nepal, water and forest related conﬂicts emerged in the sites where local adaptation plans had
been developed. The cases represent issues repeated in many locations, and larger landscape-level conﬂicts. For
example, community forestry policy in the lowlands of Nepal allocated use rights to migrants who live close to
the forest and not to traditional users who live further to the south. Similarly, polder management strategies in
southwest Bangladesh now involve coordinating the opening of polders to allow silt deposition and to ﬂush out
rivers (known as ‘tidal river management’). Hence, conﬂict drivers are complex and multi-scalar, and are diﬃcult
to clearly disentangle.
The conﬂict cases studied involve imbalances in, and disputes over, access to natural resources. However,
where the resource base changed and past cooperation was undermined by either climate related stresses
or policies and their application, these have been highlighted as factors in Table 3. This conﬁrms a strong
link between local conﬂicts over water security and changes associated with climate stresses and trends. It
also conﬁrms the signiﬁcance of gaps in policies and their application in issues over ﬁsheries, land and other
Figure 1. Annual cycle of adaptive learning among a network of community-based organizations.
Table 3. Role of climate stresses and policy limitations behind natural resource conﬂicts (number of action research cases).
Country Natural resource focus of conﬂict
Underlying natural resource conﬂict category
TotalClimate stresses and trends Policy and its application Other
Bangladesh Water 18 4 4 26
Fishery 0 6 4 10
Aquaculture enclosure 3 1 2 6
Other natural resources 0 4 1 5
Institutions 0 1 2 3
Land 0 3 0 3
Total 21 19 13 53
Nepal Forest 3 0 11 14
Water 7 0 0 7
Institutions 0 4 0 4
Land 0 0 1 1
Total 10 4 12 26
Note: All of the cases involved conﬂicts over access to natural resources. Bold indicates main underlying category.
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natural resources in Bangladesh. In Nepal, ‘other’ comprises mostly gaps in local institutions (such as the inter-
action between communities, community forestry and protected area management).
Table 3 simpliﬁes the complexity of the cases. Attributing conﬂicts to one root or trigger factor would obscure
the multiple factors involved. In most cases, a combination of factors explained how CBOs and local institutions
had been undermined or become less eﬀective, and conﬂicts with other actors or within CBOs emerged. Thir-
teen causal factors were identiﬁed (Figure 2), and while the most common was access disputes, typically 3–4 of
these factors were involved in each case, with no diﬀerence in the average number of factors between countries.
Where natural resource productivity became more uncertain, or declined, or changed its spatial distribution
due to climate changes, this directly exacerbated conﬂicts over natural resource use, and with no change in
human pressure, resulted in overexploitation. Local people observed that dry seasons were longer and/or
drier, reducing the dilution of eﬄuent in four sites in Bangladesh, thereby worsening water quality. In some
ﬂoodplain beels (waterbodies), more unreliable and erratic rainfall outside of the main monsoon meant that
there was less surface water remaining for ﬁsh to survive in sanctuaries, and with ﬁsh concentrated in
smaller areas of shallower water, this provided an opportunity for poaching and conﬂicts over ﬁshing. Similar
trends aﬀecting streams in three hill sites in Nepal and two sites in Bangladesh resulted in declining water
ﬂows, and upstream communities prevented downstream communities from diverting or collecting water. In
three sites in the mountains of Nepal, potential conﬂicts have been exacerbated and triggered by climate
trends which have shrunk traditional pastures so that yak herders have fewer alternative locations for winter
grazing, therefore increasing their pressure on community forests.
In several cases, conﬂict arose from land use changes in Bangladesh associated with expansion of ﬁsh and
prawn farming, and waterlogging in coastal polders. This may be exacerbated by climate factors, such as the
trend for saline surface water to intrude further upstream in the dry season. In the words of a poor woman
dependent on collecting aquatic plants and ﬁsh in Bangladesh: ‘The area of ﬂooded ﬁelds in the beel has
fallen, and all these resources have decreased drastically in recent years, along with my income.’ Elite
capture of resources was a factor in 20 Bangladesh cases, such as local or external investors grabbing public
lands for ﬁsh farms. Erosion of livelihoods from aquatic commons is a widespread impact on the poor, but
when the impacts are more extreme (such as when ﬁsh farms block water ﬂows and ﬂood homes) this resulted
in conﬂicts. In one site, local elites with access to the local administration obtained the lease to a public water-
way, and then blocked it for aquaculture (which is illegal) thereby negatively impacting water ﬂows and the live-
lihoods of the wider community. Such use of informal powers to grab public lands or water, despite policies to
the contrary, is a more general phenomenon (Beban, So, & Un, 2017), but in these cases, changes in water ﬂows
and siltation physically made this capture easier.
Public sector responses were also shown to worsen conﬂicts. In Nepal, expansion of protected areas and
unsympathetic application of stricter rules governing use of natural resources in buﬀer areas (to secure key habi-
tats vulnerable to climate change) increased conﬂicts between local communities and protected area auth-
orities. Moreover, in nine out of 14 community forest cases in Nepal, conﬂicts with traditional forest users
Figure 2. Factors (underlying and triggers) behind natural resource conﬂicts studied.
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who were excluded from CFUGs can be attributed to weaknesses in application of community forestry policy
and failures in local institutions. Policy impacts can have a more direct link with climate stresses. For
example, after a cyclone, the Government of Bangladesh announced that those aﬀected were exempt from
repaying loans in an attempt to minimize hardship. This undermined one CBO that operated a revolving
fund: its members defaulted and the CBO lost the ability to oﬀer services resulting in internal conﬂict. In Ban-
gladesh, stricter conservation of the Sundarbans mangrove forest helps protect villages from cyclonic storm
surges, but brought the poor into conﬂict with authorities in four cases. As one woman explained: ‘We are des-
titute, to survive we collect ﬁrewood from the forest and sell it.…we go in a group as there are so many dangers
such as tigers, snakes and forest guards. When you steal you have to deal with much more.’
4.2. Outcomes of participatory action research
Based on process documentation over three years of action research, the research team summarized the out-
comes and identiﬁed where there was a reduction in conﬂict and increase in cooperation, and the characteristics
of this change. Among the 31 cases where climate stresses contributed to local conﬂicts, 80% changed to
greater cooperation through the action research process. This contrasts with reducing conﬂict in 40% of 23
cases where policy gaps were important causal factors (Figure 3). The remaining 25 cases involved disputes
over natural resource access without inﬂuence of policy gaps or climate factors, and conﬂict reduced in
almost 60% of those cases. As will be shown, these changes involved, for example, negotiation and a revised
access arrangement, or innovations that released resource constraints and bypassed the conﬂict.
The four cases in Bangladesh where waterbody users were in conﬂict with external polluters reveal that nego-
tiation and collective pressure led to three private organizations internalizing the problem and paying for treat-
ment and eﬄuent retention. However, where municipal waste discharge was involved, the town council took no
action despite use of the courts by the ﬁshing community.
4.3. Factors causing conﬂict to persist
In 12 cases in Bangladesh and four cases in Nepal, conﬂict persisted despite action research for over three years.
In most of these cases, power, policy and institutional barriers prevented CBOs taking up potential adaptations
and innovations. For example, in Bangladesh, local elites used political connections to grab part of a public
waterbody for aquaculture excluding traditional ﬁshers.
Policy application biases remained an issue. In Bangladesh, seven ﬁsher CBOs were in conﬂict with the gov-
ernment over public waterbody policy which, on paper, should secure use rights for ﬁshers, but in practice is
used to lease use to cooperatives backed by elites on a competitive short-term basis. Dialogue with the relevant
ministry over proposed reforms, informed by this research and articulated by CBOs and researchers, stalled due
to lack of political will to reform the existing system as reform would disbeneﬁt local investors and administra-
tors. The CBOs took legal action to prevent the government from leasing out use rights to others, resulting in
protracted cases, despite initial court rulings in support of CBOs. In this context, legal processes did not help the
disadvantaged secure their rights. However, after withdrawing their legal case, two-thirds of the CBOs had the
skills and recognition to negotiate access with the local administration.
Figure 3. Outcomes of action research by role of climate and policy factors in natural resource conﬂict cases.
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In four Nepal cases, negotiation failed as the actors currently controlling forests did not agree to share
beneﬁts and no win-win options or alternatives were identiﬁed that would enhance natural resource availability
for the disadvantaged communities.
4.4. Factors enabling transformation from local conﬂict to greater cooperation
Outcomes and reasons for change were documented in 63 cases where conﬂict was resolved or transformed
into cooperation, and where partial resolution was achieved during three years of action research. In consul-
tation with the communities, the research team considered changes to be sustainable or transformative
based on documented increased cooperation, changes in local institutions that are more inclusive and/or
accepted by the involved actors to be fairer or more just, and in particular where there were changes in
tenure over natural resources (36 cases beneﬁting previously disadvantaged poorer people). In 12 cases,
actions partially resolved or reduced conﬂict without fundamentally transforming the situation. The evidence
revealed nine main factors enabling these changes, which are discussed here. The percentages of cases where
these factors contributed to change are shown in Figure 4. There was no single ‘solution’; on average, a com-
bination of 4–5 enabling actions and approaches reduced conﬂict and enhanced cooperation. Cluster analysis
identiﬁed ﬁve associations of enabling factors and their contexts. Three were mainly in Bangladesh: a set of
water and associated commons cases where learning networks plus policy application and the contribution of
‘other facilitators’ (facilitation from sources in addition to the research team, for example local councils)
enabled conﬂict to be overcome; water related cases where incentives, knowledge, as well as other facilitators
were the main enablers of change; and non-water related cases where governance innovations and incentives
were the main enabling factors. Two were mainly in Nepal: water cases where technical innovation, other
facilitators and incentives enabled change; and diverse cases where innovations (technical and governance),
learning networks, and incentives were the main factors. The role and examples of each factor are discussed
below.
Dialogue and negotiationwere followed in most cases and changed understanding, attitudes and positions
of actors. Dialogue is an integral part of participatory action research, but negotiation was added for this study.
Dialogue can be considered necessary to address conﬂict, but not all negotiations resulted in transformation. In
one Bangladesh site, early attempts to negotiate between CBOs to share water failed because the CBO with
more than enough water feared that climate stresses in future would reduce its water supply. Other factors
(local knowledge and a technical innovation – see below – complemented by new institutional arrangements)
subsequently enabled the disadvantaged community to collectively restore lost springs, thereby compensating
for increasingly unreliable rain in the dry season.
Figure 4. Approaches used in 63 cases where conﬂict was transformed into greater cooperation.
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Incentives played an important transformational role in a majority of cases in both countries. The incentives
involved took diﬀerent forms. In nine community forest cases in Nepal, CBOs recognized limited access rights for
previously excluded groups who were sources of rule breaking and conﬂict, thus converting illegal activities into
CBO regulated activities. In ﬁve cases (both countries), disadvantaged communities started to pay to secure use
and decision-making rights. For example, in Nepal, a local club mobilized payment from a disadvantaged lower
community towards its activities and helped persuade the richer upstream community to share water and
permit a multiple use water system to be constructed, beneﬁting women from the low caste community. Simi-
larly, in Bangladesh, in a dispute between two CBOs, the CBO adversely aﬀected by a distant sluice gate agreed,
after negotiation, to contribute towards maintenance costs on condition that it secured a right to be rep-
resented in operating decisions. This cooperation leveraged support from the government. The repaired gate
could then be operated eﬀectively for crop cultivation in the lower area without adversely aﬀecting farmers
closer to the sluice. In the words of the secretary of the adversely aﬀected CBO: ‘Now we have a say over
sluice operation.… All farmers are happy with two crops…more ﬁsh are recruited from the river, 90% of
women also beneﬁt as they are catching ﬁsh for household consumption.’ Lastly, in almost all cases, conﬂict
resolution beneﬁted CBO leaders socially through local recognition of their role. For example, leaders from
socially disadvantaged groups were appreciated in local events, and some CBO leaders subsequently were
elected to local government councils.
Enhanced knowledge played an important role in about half of the cases. In Nepal, this involved external
expertise from the research team or from the Forest Department helping CBOs estimate sustainable yields
and demand and supply for forest products, so that they could understand how much fuelwood could be har-
vested by users who had been excluded by community forestry policies. Local indigenous knowledge also
played a role. For example, in Bangladesh, elders in one community identiﬁed where former springs had
silted up. By digging out silt, the CBO restored the springs and enhanced water ﬂow, thus averting conﬂict
over water and encouraging collective action to maintain springs.
Technical measures and innovations helped overcome natural resource constraints underlying conﬂict,
including water stresses associated with climate factors. Multiple use water systems were introduced in three
Nepal sites to store and transfer water eﬃciently from upstream communities to lower communities where
women saved time and eﬀort collecting water for domestic purposes and now grow high value vegetables.
In Bangladesh, six CBOs mobilized resources to repair sluice gates to improve their operation, which helped
overcome conﬂicts that had arisen due to problems operating them.
Institutional innovation and reform, including changes in CBO membership, rules and their relations with
other natural resource users, was important in transforming about half of the cases in both countries. Where
previously disadvantaged stakeholders agreed to contribute fees in return for access to resources or a role in
decision making, this was part of local institutional change (those stakeholders became represented in the
CBO, or forums were established between neighbouring CBOs). Other institutional innovations made use of
opportunities within policy frameworks. In southwest Bangladesh, a rich person had leased a waterway from
the government and then subleased it to 20 people for ﬁsh farming, blocking water ﬂows and ﬂooding a
large cultivated area. Here, the solution oﬀered by government oﬃcers was for the CBO to register as a
ﬁsher cooperative so that it could obtain the lease and then manage the waterway in a more environmentally
friendly way. In Nepal where there was conﬂict between CFUGs and yak herders, the innovation adopted was to
zone community land into blocks for rotational grazing. In the words of a chauri (hybrid yak-cattle) herder:
‘Before we used to face many problems due to community forestry.… Villagers even vandalized the sheds.
… But now it is diﬀerent.…We mainly discuss…where we can take chauri for grazing.… So we have
started practicing grazing on a rotation basis.’ In other Nepal cases, CFUGs added stakeholders who had
been excluded, or reformed their structure with sub-committees for each hamlet. While some institutional inno-
vations are consistent with relevant policies, others depend on local discretion and need to be regularized by
policy reform or guidelines.
Adaptive learning networks between CBOs were tested (where CBO leaders meet regularly to share
lessons, see Section 3.2 and Figure 1), and contributed to conﬂict resolution or enhancing cooperation in 30
cases. CBOs were encouraged to take up collective adaptations and innovations shared by CBOs. An important
mechanism for conﬂict resolution was peer pressure on CBOs that were perceived as lagging behind or failing to
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negotiate or adopt innovations. The networks also mobilized nearby CBOs to help mediate in some cases. In
most freshwater ﬂoodplain sites in southwest Bangladesh, the CBO network engaged in mediation or inﬂuenced
CBO leaders to adopt good practices.
Gaps in policies and their application were already shown to contribute to natural resource conﬂict, for
example by enabling elite capture of waterbodies with changed characteristics, or preventing negotiation
with, and inclusion of, forest users from distant communities. The cases show how policy interpretation can
be made more sensitive to conﬂicts and the needs of the disadvantaged. In over 40% of Bangladesh cases,
changes in how policies were implemented or interpreted contributed to reducing conﬂict. In northwest Ban-
gladesh, landless erosion victims along the Brahmaputra River had been allocated land that emerged on islands
in the river, but were unable to take possession of this land due to complex processes. After a facilitated meeting
between a CBO and the sub-district land administrator, the administrator agreed to explain and assist in the
process and all 35 landless households actually took possession of land.
Voluntary multi-stakeholder forums were introduced at the district (and central) levels as a way to engage
government oﬃcials, opinion leaders, NGOs and academics with the CBO networks and research team. They
contributed to local transformation of conﬂict in nine cases, by mobilizing government oﬃcers to advise,
mediate, or provide resources to CBOs. However, these forums were short lived and one of the least important
enabling factors.
Neutral intermediaries (government, researchers, and/or other CBOs) have an important enabling role. In
all of the action research cases, there was facilitation from the research team. But facilitation from govern-
ment actors (termed ‘other facilitators’) was important in almost half of cases in both countries. This was
mobilized by the research team; it seems unlikely that these oﬃcials would have facilitated if they were
only approached by the disadvantaged groups in local conﬂicts. Nevertheless, their role was signiﬁcant
as they have formal authority over natural resources, are respected, and can access other government
resources. In southwest Bangladesh, a CBO organized a mass movement from 19 villages aﬀected by
elite capture of a waterway and sluice which blocked water ﬂows. They petitioned the sub-district admin-
istrator who agreed to pursue their request and shared their problem with the district administration and
local Member of Parliament. This mobilized three government agencies that collectively re-excavated the
canal.
5. Conclusions
Do local natural resource conﬂicts, and factors enabling their transformation, matter for climate change related
policy? We conclude that attention should focus more on widespread local natural resource conﬂicts that
deepen inequality and constrain the adaptive capacity of the disadvantaged. Climate stresses rarely created
conﬂicts, but in many of the cases studied, they exacerbated conﬂict. Policy gaps (sectoral compartmentaliza-
tion, rigidity, application manipulated by those with power) were also important. Many of these climate
inﬂuenced conﬂicts can be resolved and even transformed, but this requires responsive enabling facilitation
and support for collective action.
Conﬂict is not necessarily negative; in some of the cases, it brought together the disadvantaged who
cooperated in movements for their rights. Thus, conﬂict can be part of a dynamic process of change and trans-
formation that brings beneﬁts, as well as costs. There are transaction costs to these changes, and the action
research reported here may be diﬃcult to replicate on a large scale, but ultimately, in a majority of cases, the
beneﬁts from cooperation are greater.
The cases reveal the scope for capacity building and reform of local institutions to reduce conﬂict, but if those
institutions could be changed over three years, might changes be reversed and not transformational? Insti-
tutions need to adapt as new challenges emerge, and cases were considered to be successes for one or
more of several reasons. For example, where changes in membership or access rules were embedded in CBO
constitutions or management plans endorsed by government agencies, or where secure changes in tenure
favour disadvantaged stakeholders. Improvements in social relations and trust between actors were demon-
strated by cooperation in work or social functions. Lastly, where win-win outcomes can be achieved, formerly
conﬂicting actors have an incentive to continue cooperating.
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Lack of coordination between sectoral policies encouraged conﬂict, failed to regulate over exploitation of
commons, and in Bangladesh, failed to ensure long term use rights to public waterbodies. The cases also
reveal the role of biased application and misinterpretation of existing polices in perceived injustices and
local natural resource conﬂicts. Gaps and fuzzy policies, as well as environmental changes associated with
climate stresses, created opportunities for local elites to undermine or bypass existing local institutions and
capture common natural resources.
Opportunities for grassroots stakeholders to participate in policy debates are needed. Policies are adopted
with limited deliberation, and local initiatives in natural resource management and adaptation are not ade-
quately mainstreamed. In Bangladesh, adaptation policies are geared towards sectoral and project-based
approaches that favour large scale government interventions, rather than taking a coordinated approach or,
as in Nepal, encouraging locally owned ﬂexible adaptation.
This study contributes to understanding of the role of climate change in local natural resources conﬂict, and is
novel for providing evidence of the eﬀectiveness of factors within participatory approaches to reduce conﬂict,
strengthen adaptation and, in many cases, to enable transformative change. This involved combinations of
enabling factors and approaches according to local social and environmental context. Innovations adjusting
local institutions and natural resource characteristics, developing incentives and mechanisms for actors to
share costs and beneﬁts, enhancing local knowledge, and adaptive learning within and between communities
all played their parts in change. Scaling up and replication of these achievements requires a ﬂexible, participa-
tory and decentralized approach that recognizes all stakeholder interests in designing larger adaptation pro-
grammes. Such approaches should build local institutions with a strong mandate and tenure security over
local commons based on inclusive governance.
Note
1. Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2001 it was decided to support least developed
countries to prepare their respective National Adaptation Plans of Action. These were to prioritize their immediate and
urgent adaptation needs. Bangladesh was one of the ﬁrst countries to complete a NAPA. The UNFCCC established a National
Adaptation Plan process in 2010 covering all countries to enhance medium-long term mainstreaming of climate change adap-
tation into national development.
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